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known legal meaning.'1 7  Nevertheless, it is only fair to add that
the aim of the default procedures of Article 9 is to promote dis-
position of collateral at the highest possible price, both for the
benefit of the secured party and the debtor, by providing for sale
through regular market channels rather than through public sale
where collusive agreements are not uncommon.
It is felt that the advantages of the Secured Transactions
Article of the Code outweigh its disadvantages. What is lost in
new and revolutionary terminology, and in spelling out too
minutely the rights and obligations of the parties, is gained in




ELIMINATION OF ACCRUED DIVIDENDS-COMPARISON
OF NEW YORK AND DELAWARE LAW
Introduction
Corporations emerging from a general economic depression
or the profitless first years of business are confronted with the
problem of heavy arrearages on cumulative preferred shares. To
the corporate management these arrearages constitute a mill-
stone: they drag down the market price of the corporation's stock,
thereby undermining any attempted venture to raise new capital
by sale of stock; they depreciate the corporation's credit status;
and lastly, the aggravate the impatience of the common share-
holders. Is there any legal way the corporation can shake off
this dead weight? The answer given by the courts of New York
and of Delaware is the scope of this comment.'
117. But see U. C. C. § 9-507 (2): "The term commercially reasonable includes,
among other things, obtaining approval of the secured party's place of disposition in a
judicial proceeding or by a bona fide creditors' committee or representative of the
creditors." The fact that a better price could have been obtained is not in itself
sufficient to establish that the sale was not commercially reasonable.
* The New York State Law Revision Commission will undertake a study of
the proposed Code before it is presented ta the New York legislature. N. Y. Times,
Feb. 9, 1953, p. 37, coL 5. It is contemplated that this study will be divided into three
phases: a comparison with present law, public hearings, and a recommendation to the
legislature. It is understood that this will not be completed for the 1954 session of the
New York legislature.
1. The historical background of this problem began in 1819. In that year the
U. S. Supreme Court, per Chief Justice Marshall. decided that a corporate charter was
a contract, protected by the Constitution from impairment in its essential form. Trustees
of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 (U. S. 1819). Story, J., added that
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New York
The first case on the subject presented to the New York Court
of Appeals was Roberts v. Roberts-Wicks Co., in 1906.2 The
Roberts-Wicks Co. was chartered in 1895. The law then existing
permitted a corporation to increase or reduce its capital stock by
vote of the stockholders ;S there was no other statutory authority
which could be interpreted to allow a cancellation of accrued
dividends. The plaintiff was the holder of cumulative preferred
shares. From 1901 to 1904, the Roberts-Wicks Co. paid no pre-
ferred dividends. In 1904 it reduced its preferred stock. The
plaintiff voted against reduction but the requisite percentage was
attained. New certificates were issued to represent the reduced
preferred stock. Six months later the corporation declared a
dividend, dated from the exchange of the old certificates for the
new. It also declared a dividend payable to the common shares.
Plaintiff claimed that before any dividends could be paid to the
common, he was first entitled to the arrearages that had built up
from 1901 to 1904. The Court of Appeals declared that the
accumulation provision in plaintiff's old certificates was a binding
contract between the company and the preferred stockholders;
that the law authorizing the corporation to increase or decrease
its capital stock was not intended to allow the cancellation of
arrearages, but only increases or decreases in the capital stock;
and that even if the statute did authorize an elimination of arrear-
ages, it could not affect any vested rights, nor impair the force
of any corporate obligation. The two important points to be ex-
tracted from Roberts v. Roberts-Wicks Co. are: the New York
corporate law then existing did not authorize a corporation by
vote of its stockholders to directly cancel accrued dividends; and
if the statute did authorize such a cancellation, it would be un-
constitutional, as a violation of a vested right.
About the same time the Court of Appeals was considering
Roberts v. Roberts-Wicks Co., the Appellate Division was hearing
Hinckley v. Schwarzehild and Co.4 There, defendant corporation
a corporation was subject to no control other than that expressly or impliedly reserved
by the charter itself Id. at 675, 712. The decision had two effects: it conferred consti-
tutional protection upon corporate charters; and it initiated state activity to insert reserved
clauses. N. Y. CoxsT. Art. 10, § 1; N. Y. GEN. CoRP. LAW § 5; D. CoRP. LAW § 82.
Theoretically speaking, the reserved clause would seem to enable a state, as one party
to the "contract", to amend or repeal the charter at will, or to delegate that power to
the stockholders. See note, 29 CoRNu.L L. Q. 114 (1943). But the courts were quick
to limit this apparently absolute theoretical authority. See Coombs v. Getz, 285 U. S.
434 (1932).
2. 184 N.Y. 257, 77 N.E. 1073 (1906).
3. L. 1890, c. 564, as amended by 1. 1892, c. 588.
4. 107 App. Div. 470, 95 N.Y. Supp. 357 (1st Dep't 1905).
alL-
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was organized in 1893. Only common stock was authorized and
issued. The corporation law then existing required the unanimous
consent of all common stockholders to the issuance of preferred
stock.5 It was amended in 1901 to require only a two-thirds vote."
Shortly afterward, with the requisite two-thirds vote, the corpora-
tion issued a new class of preferred stock. The plaintiff, a common
stockholder, sued to restrain the new issue on the ground that the
statutory authority on which the corporation acted was unconstitu-
tional as -to corporations organized prior to the amendment. The
Court refused the injunction, declaring that the amendment was
a valid exercise of the reserved power of the Legislature. The
result of the decision was to establish the principle that a corpora-
tion could legally issue new preferred stock by a two-thirds vote
of its stockholders. Implicit in this principle was the corollary
that if a corporation could legally issue new preferred prior to
old common, it could also legally issue new preferred prior to old
preferred. The implications were momentous. A corporation,
with the ostensible purpose of raising new capital by a public sale
of stock, could issue prior preferred shares. But instead of offer-
ing the stock to the public for cash, the corporation proposes to the
old preferred shareholders an exchange of their stock with arrear-
ages for the new preferred. To secure the requisite two-thirds vote,
the corporation cloaks the exchange with various attractions, such
as a liberal exchange rate, voting rights, or a cash dividend.
And if there is any anxiety that a few preferred shareholders
who voted against the exchange will stand adamant and demand
their arrearages before the common shares receive any dividend,
the corporation may impose sanctions, such as excerpting whatever
preferential rights it can from the old preferred stock,7 and set-
ting a time limit for the exchange.8 Realizing that the existence of
the new preferred stock will depreciate the market value of his
present holdings, and that it will sink even lower when it is removed
from listing on the Stock Exchange, 9 the recalcitrant preferred
shareholder generally submits to the exchange. This device for
adjusting accrued dividends was first accomplished in Matter of
Dresser,0 in 1936, and has been frequently and successfully used
since then." No right of appraisal is granted to the dissenting
5. L. 1892, c. 688.
6. L. 1901, c. 354.
7. See 40 COL. L. REv. 633 (1940).
8. For an illustration of the disastrous consequences of this sanction, see Matter
of Druer, 270 N. Y. 343, 1 N.E. 2d 457 (1936).
9. See 26 MINN. I- REv. 387 (1942).
10. 247 N.Y. 553, 161 N.E. 171 (1928).
11. Matter of Druer, supra n. 8; In re Kinney, 279 N.Y. 423, 18 N.E. 2d 645
(1939) ; In re Woodruff, 175 Misc. 819, 26 N.Y. S. 2d 679 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
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shareholder. 12 The net result of this practice is to allow a corpora-
tion to accomplish indirectly what could not be achieved directly
under the decision of Roberts v. Roberts-Wicks Co. And while
it might be argued that there is no cause for complaint by the
dissenting preferred shareholder, since he willingly surrenders
his arrearage right, the counter argument might be made that this
surrender is far from voluntary.13
To return to the subject of direct cancellation, in 1923 § 36 of
the Stock Corporation Law was enacted,14 which authorized a cor-
poration to effect changes in respect to preferential rights by a
two-thirds vote of the shareholders adversely affected. 5 However,
which preferential rights might be legitimately altered were not
specifically defined. In 1941, Davidson v. Parke, Austin and Lips-
comb, Inc.,'" came before the Court of Appeals. The defendant
corporation was organized in 1914, and had issued cumulative pre-
ferred shares on which dividends were in arrears. In reliance
upon § 36, a resolution was passed by two-thirds of the preferred
shareholders to cancel the arrearages. Plaintiff, a preferred
shareholder, dissented and sued to have the resolution declared
void. The Court of Appeals declared that the issue to be decided
was not whether the right of the plaintiff was vested or not, but
rather whether § 36, which spoke in general terms of reclassifica-
tion, included the specific power to reclassify so as to eliminate
arrearages. The Court reasoned that there was no express state-
ment of intent in the statute; that when the Legislature enacted
the section it must have known of the decision in Roberts v.
Roberts-Wicks Co., and by failing to include an express statement
on the matter, it implied that it did not intend it. The decision
was greeted favorably for its rejection of the "vested rights"
argument, which assumes its own conclusion, and for stating the
problem in its basic simplicity: Has the Legislature authorized
the cancellation of accrued dividends by a less than unanimous
consent of the preferred shareholders? And if so, is such pro-
cedure constitutional.?71
Shortly afterward, a second indirect method of adjusting ar-
rearages was achieved in Zoebel et al. v. American Locomotive Co.
12. Matter of Dresser, supra n. 10; In re Kinney, supra n. 11; cf. Matter of Sil-
bcrkraus, 250 N.Y. 242, 165 N. E. 279 (1929).
13. For a decision disallowing this device solely on this point, see Patterson v.
Durham Hosiery Mills, 214 N. C. 806, 200 S. E. 906 (1939) ; and see 55 HIv. L. Rav.
1196 (1942).
14. L. 1923, c. 787; its provisions are now found in N. Y. Stock Corp. Law § 35.
15. While § 36 itself spoke of "classification or reclassification" §§ 37 and 38,
as then existing, implied that § 36 included alterations of preferential rights.
16. 285 N.Y. 500. 35 N. E. 2d 618 (1941).
17. See 26 MiiqN. L. Ra,. 387 (1942)'; 19 N.Y.U. L. Q. 196 (1942) ; 29 CoRmNau
I. Q. 114 (1943).
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et al.18 The defendant corporation had issued cumulative prefer-
red stock in 1901, dividends on which were in arrears in 1943. In
that year a merger was proposed with a wholly owned subsidiary,
by the terms of which preferred shares with arrearages would be
exchanged for other stock plus cash. The merger was approved,
but certain minority holders of preferred stock objected, and sued
to enjoin the merger on the grounds that it was not in reality a
true merger, but a recapitalization brought about through the
mechanism of a merger with a wholly owned subsidiary. The
Supreme. Court refused to grant the injunction prohibiting the
merger. It reasoned that the rights of the plaintiffs were con-
tractual, and as such were subject to statutes in existence at the
time the stock was issued; that the law at the time the stock was
issued allowed a merger with a wholly owned subsidiary, and that
consequently plaintiff had no cause to object." The Court added
that the fact that the motivating cause of the proposed merger
was to wipe out the preferred shareholders' first call upon earned
surplus and future profits to the extent of the accumulated arrears
of their stock was not relevant, there being no showing that the
exchange was so unfair as to amount to fraud or bad faith. When
contrasted with the first indirect device,-the issuance of prior
preferred-, the second indirect method has, from the viewpoint of
the preferred shareholder, one redeeming quality: the dissenting
preferred shareholder has the right of appraisal.20
While the above case was being heard, the Legislature amend-
ed § 36 to read that a "reclassification" under § 36 included the
specific power to abolish accumulated dividends.21 The amendment
unequivocally opened the door to the direct method of elimination.
The only question remaining was whether it was constitutional.
A test case arose in 1945, in McNulty v. W. & J. Sloane.22  The
defendant corporation was organized in 1891, long before the
amendment. In 1944 its preferred stock was in arrears. A. resolu-
tion was passed abolishing all the old stock, common and preferred,
and creating new common and preferred, with a ratio of exchange
of old for new. The plaintiff, who voted against the resolution,
applied to the Court to determine whether it was constitutional
for § 36 to allow this reclassification. The late Judge Shientag
18. 182 Misc. 323, 44 N. Y. S. 2d 33 (Sup. Ct 1943) ; the same device vas laterused in Anderson v. International Minerals and Chemicals Corp., 295 N. Y. 343, 67
N. F_. 2d 573 (1946).
19. The Court advanced another rationale: the state's reserved power to alteror amend was comprehensive enough to allow it to insert a merger provision evenafter the stock was issued. The Court declined to state on which rationale it rested
its decision.
20. N. Y. STocx Coni. LAw § 85 (7).
21. L. 1943, c. 600.
22. 184 Misc. 835, 54 N. Y. S. 2d 253 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
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said it was. He declared that by reason of the reserved' power
of the State, the Legislature could authorize any alteration of
preferential rights, subject only to the fundamental mandate that
property should not be taken without due process of the law; that
the test of due process was whether there was a reasonable basis
for the law; that the problem involved was a very knotty one, con-
taining questions of public policy, such as the interest in permitting
corporations a certain flexibility in their capital structure to meet
business and financial need, as against the interests of small in-
vestors; that in balancing these interests, he could not say that
the Legislature had acted unreasonably, especially since the pre-
ferred shareholder has the protection of the good judgment of
his fellow shareholders, the right of appraisal if they disagree with
him, and the underlying safeguard of a court of equity.
No appeal was taken. The decision has been followed by the
Appellate Division,23 and cited with approval by the Court of
Appeals.2 4 Consequently, it is rational to say that McNul ty v.
W. & J. Sloane represents the New York law. However, the ulti-
mate word on its constitutionality in each particular case rests
with the Supreme Court of the United States.
The effect of McNulty v. W. & J. Sloane is to allow direct elimina-
tion of accrued dividends in New York by resolution of two-thirds
of the preferred shareholders. Accordingly, it will probably bring
to an end the vitality of the two indirect methods, relegating them
to the position of historical landmarks in the field of New York
corporate law.
Delaware
The first ease on the subject presented to the Delaware Courts
was Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., in 1923.25 The defend-
ant corporation was incorporated in 1912, and had issued cumula-
tive preferred stock. The Delaware law existing at that time allow-
ed a corporation to alter the preference rights of any class of stock
by a majority vote of the stockholders affected.2 6 Arrearages ac-
cumulated on the preferred shares. Th 1923, an amendment to
the charter was passed which was designed to affect a cancellation
of preferred arrearages through the creation of new prior pre-
ferred stock and a compulsory exchange plan. The effect of the
latter amounted to a direct cancellation. The plaintiff, a protest-
23. Liebschultz v. Shaeffer Store Co., 270 App. Div. 1, 93 N.Y. S. 2d 125 (3d
Dep't 1949).
24. Anderson v. International Mineral and Chemicals Corp., supra n. 18.
25. 14 Del. Ch. 136. 122 At. 696 (1923).
26. 25 LAws OF DELwAwRE c. 155. § 1.
315
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
ing preferred shareholder, sued to have the amendment declared
void. The Chancellor declared that the charter was a contract,
one of the terms of which was the statutes of Delaware at the time
it was made, and reasoned that since an alteration of preferences
was allowed by statute, the plaintiff could not complain as to the
issuance of the prior preferred stock; but as to the cancellation of
the accrued dividends, he declared that part of the amendment
void, reasoning that the right to arrearages was not a preference
right within the meaning of the statute, but a vested right. The
effect of the decision was twofold: it incorporated the vested right
doctrine into Delaware law, thus barring the direct elimination
of arrearages; but it allowed indirect elimination by means of a
voluntary exchange plan through the creation of prior preferred
stock.
2 7
Following Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., the next
case to be heard by the Delaware Courts was Keller v. Wilson and
Co.,2 in 1936. Wilson and Co. was incorporated in Delaware in
1925, and had issued cumulative preferred stock. In 1927, § 26
of the Delaware Corporation Law was amended to allow alteration
of preferential or "other special rights" of stock. By 1935 the
arrearages on the preferred shares were more than twelve million
dollars. A recapitalization plan was voted by the stockholders
which, by compelling an exchange of stock, attempted to directly
cancel the accrued dividends. The plaintiff, a holder of preferred
stock who had not approved the resolution, sued, claiming that the
law existing at the time the corporation was formed did not permit
the direct cancellation of accrued shares, and that if the subsequent
amendment were construed to allow it, it would violate the contract
clause and due process of law. The Supreme Court of Delaware
upheld this contention, stating that the plaintiff had a vested right
which was immune from subsequent state action; and that the
amendment of § 26 was not intended to permit accrued dividends
to be cancelled. Focusing solely on the constitutional argument,
the decision seemed to leave the implication that a corporation
organized after 1927, the year § 26 was amended, could alter its
charter so as to eliminate accrued dividends.29
That precise point was argued before the Supreme Court of
Delaware one year later, in Consolidated Film Industries v. John-
son."0 The defendant, Consolidated Film Industries, was organized
27. This device was availed of as such for the first time in Yoakarn v. Providence
Biltmore Hotel Co.. 34 F. 2d 533 (R. I. 1929).
28. 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 Atl. 115 (1936); the decision in effect overruled Harrv. Pioneer Mechanical Corp., 65 F. 2d 332 (2d Cir. 1933), which had given an opposite
construction to § 26.
29. That this was generally conjectured, see 31 ILu. L. REv. 661 (1937).
30. 22 DeL Ch. 407. 197 Atl. 489 (1937).
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in 1928, and had issued cumulative preferred stock, which by 1936
was in arrears. In 1936, an amendment was passed which pro-
vided for a compulsory stock exchange, the effect of which was to
directly cancel the accumulated dividends. The plaintiff, a pre-
ferred shareholder, sued to enjoin carrying out the amendment,
relying on Keller v. Wilson and Co. The defendant argued that
since the corporation was formed after 1927, § 26 (which authorized
direct elimination of arrearages) was a part of the stock contract
and could validly be used. The Supreme Court agreed, but it
granted the injunction nevertheless, relying on its reasoning in
Keller v. Wilson and Co. that there was no indication that the
Legislature intended § 26 to apply retroactively, i. e., to dividends
already accrued. The effect of this decision was effectively to
prohibit the elimination of accrued dividends in Delaware by a
compulsory stock exchange plan.
In 1940, the Delaware Supreme Court was presented with the
question whether accumulated dividends could be cancelled in-
directly, through the device of a merger. Indirect cancellation,
by means of an issuance of prior preferred stock, had been tole-
rated in Morris v. American Public Utilities Co. But there was
some doubt whether present Delaware sentiment, as expressed so
strongly in Keller v. Wilson and Co. and Consolidated Film Indus-
tries v. Johnson, would condone it in the new merger situation.
The case in which it was submitted for adjudication was Federal
United Corporation v. Havender8  Federal United was incor-
porated in 1932. By 1936 the cumulative preferred stock was in
arrears. At that time a proposal was made to merge with a wholly
owned subsidiary, and an exchange ratio adopted, whereby new
stock would be given for the surrender of old preferred with
arrearages. The plaintiff, a preferred shareholder, sued in equity
to have the merger declared void. The Supreme Court of Delaware
was of the view that a inerger with a wholly owned subsidiary was
allowed by the Delaware Law.32 The Court reasoned that the
substantial elements of the merger provision had existed from the
inception of Delaware corporation law; that these provisions were
written into every charter; that every shareholder has notice that
the corporation whose shares he has acquired might be merged
with another if the required number of shareholders agree; that as
an incident to the merger, preference and accrual rights may, and
perhaps, must be the subject of readjustment; that plaintiff has
no fixed or vested rights as far as a merger is concerned; and that
'31. 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A. 2d 331 (1940).
32. Da. GEN. Coap. LAW § 59; a two-thirds vote of all capital stock. is required.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
consequently he must either exercise his right of appraisal,3 or
show that the terms of the merger were unfair or inequitable. The
Court found the exchange was fair. The reasoning of the case
has been criticized; the argument made is that it was fallacious for
the Court to base its holding on the premise that a merger neces-
sitated an adjustment of conflicting interests between two separate
sets of shareholders, because where the merger was with a wholly
owned subsidiary, no such conflict existed.34  The effect of the
decision was to open the door to the adjustment of accrued divi-
dends by merger, subject only to the limitation of the equitable
principle of fairness, and the right of appraisal. The same device
was used, and sustained, where it was effected with a wholly owned
subsidiary created for the specific purpose of the merger.3
It was also followed in Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp.,3" a sub-
sequent Delaware decision. The case is interesting to examine
for the light it sheds on the force of the words "fair and equita-
ble", the words of judicial protection that were expressed by the
Court in Federal United Corp. v. Havender. The Vadsco Sales
Corp. was contemplating a merger with its wholly owned sub-
sidiary for the purpose of bringing about an adjustment of its
preferred arrearages, which at the time amounted to approxi-
mately one million, eight hundred thousand dollars. The comn-
pany had approximately twenty-one thousand shares of 7%
cumulative preferred outstanding (liquidation value, one hun-
dred dollars; redemption value, one hundred and ten dollars),
and one million shares of common, of no par value. Both classes
were voting. At the time the merger was proposed, the com-
pany had a deficit of two and one-half million dollars. The new
stock consisted of preferred, cumulative at two dollars and fifty
cents per year, with a liquidation value of fifty dollars, and a re-
demption value of fifty-two dollars and fifty cents, and the right
to elect a majority of directors if the arrearages reached six dol-
lars and twenty-five cents a share. The exchange ratio was one
share of old preferred with arrearages for one share of new
33. DEL. GEN. CoRP. LAW § 61. But see § 59a, which applies specifically to amerger of a parent corporation with a wholly owned subsidiary, and states that § 61 is
not applicable to a merger under its provisions, but excepts any other changes with
respect to the parent corporation. The writer assumes that the exception includes re-
capitalization, but has found no express adjudication sustaining his assumption. Porges
v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127, 32 A. 2d 148 (1943), by allowing appraisal, has
implied it.
34. 24 MIN-w. L. Rxv. 992 (1940).
35. Hottenstein v. York Ice Machinery Corp., 136 F. 2d 944 (3d Cir. 1943),
which points out the fallacy in the reasoning of the Federal United Corp. v. Havender,
which was regarded as standing for an express reversal of Keller v. Wilson and Co. and
Consolidated Filn Industries v. Johnson. However, research fails to show that any
Delaware court or federal court has seen fit to adopt the dictum.
36. Supra n. 33.
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preferred and five shares of new COMMon. 37 The plaintiff sued,
charging that the exchange was inequitable, and consequently that
the merger should be enjoined. He introduced the company
balance sheet to show that the net worth of the company was
approximately two million, two hundred and twenty thousand dol-
lars, and the sum of par value or fixed liquidation value of the
preferred stock was two million, one hundred thousand dollars,
which when added to the arrearages due, gave a sum of three
million, nine hundred thousand dollars. From that the plaintiff
argued the interest 6f the preferred stockholders was greater
than the net worth, and consequently the common stock should
not participate in the exchange, for it had no equity left. The
Court denied the injunction; it declared that the unfairness which
is actionable must be so clear as to impel the conclusion that it
emanates from acts of bad faith or a reckless indifference to the
rights of others, rather than from an honest error of judgment.
Applying the test, the Court could find no such unfairness; book
values were not evidence of the going concern value, and the pre-
ferred stock now had voting control plus a sinking fund. The
effect of the decision is to indicate that only brazen unfairness
will be enjoined by Delaware Courts.
In 1941, the case of Shanik v. White Sewing Machine Corp."
was decided. In brief, it was an attempt to adjust accrued divi-
dends by the issuance of prior preferred stock. The Court sus-
tained it, thus reaffirming the decision in Morris v. American
Public Utilities Co., which almost twenty years before had upheld
a similar plan.
In the light of these decisions, Delaware law will allow the
elimination of accrued dividends whether by the issuance of
prior preferred stock or by merger. A dissenting shareholder has
the right of appraisal, plus the protection of equitable safeguards.
But accumulated dividends cannot be directly eliminated.
Conclusion .
It appears that the only major difference between New York
and Delaware as regards the elimination of accrued dividends lies
in the subject of direct cancellation. Assuming that there is a
rational basis for allowing the elimination of accrued dividends,
the position of the Delaware Courts is inconsistent. Looking at
the substance of things, what basis of distinction can be pointed
out so as to permit the indirect methods yet prohibit the direct
37. Since nothing was said by the Vice-Chancellor as to the character of the new
common, the writer has assumed it was identical to the old common.
38. 25 Del. Ch. 371, 19 A. 2d 831 (1941).
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method? It is naive to say that, as between a direct exchange and
the indirect exchange by issuance of prior preferred, the former
is compulsory and the latter is voluntary. Similarly, it is naive
to say that, as between a direct exchange and an indirect exchange
by merger, the former is the product of relentless force while the
latter a compromise of conflicting interests. In the opinion of
the writer, it is submitted that the Delaware Courts should re-
examine their present position, and eliminate its incongruity.
As for the basic assumption, that the elimination of accrued
dividends rests on a rational foundation, it should be conceded
that the problem is a knotty one, and only the test of time can
evaluate the truth of the arguments for and against it. 39
Robert Shaus
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39. For rational opposition, see 55 HARV. L. REv. 1196 (1942) ; 50 HARv. L. REV.
488 (1941) ; 57 HAIy. L. REV. 894 (1944), where it is pointed out that corpbrations with
heavy arrearages have successfully raised new capital, thus destroying the merit of the
argument that economic necessity requires the elimination of arrearages.
